Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors by Boyle, James
FOUCAULT IN CYBERSPACE: SURVEILLANCE,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND HARDWIRED CENSORS
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I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he problems to which the theory of.sovereignty was addressed
were in effect confined to the general mechanisms of power, to the
way in which its forms of existence at the higher level of society
influenced its exercise at the lowest levels .... In effect, the mode in
which power was exercised could be defined in its essentials in terms
of the relationship sovereign-subject. But . . . we have the . . .
emergence, or rather the invention, of a new mechanism of power
possessed of highly specific procedural techniques ... which is also, I
believe, absolutely incompatible with the relations of sovereignty....
It is a type of power which is constantly exercised by means of
surveillance rather than in a discontinuous manner by means of a
system of levies or obligations distributed over time. It presupposes
a tightly knit grid of material coercions rather than the physical
existence of a sovereign .... This non-sovereign power, which lies
outside the form of sovereignty, is disciplinary power.'
This is an Article about law in cyberspace. It focuses on three
interdependent phenomena: a set of political and legal assumptions that
I call the jurisprudence of digital libertarianism, a separate but related
set of beliefs about the state's supposed inability to regulate the Internet,
and a preference for technological solutions to hard legal issues on-line.
* Copyright 1997 James Boyle, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American
University. My remarks at the Symposium dealt more specifically with the law and policy of proposed
changes to copyright on the Interet. However, I have already outlined some of those views in print, and
at some length. S&eJAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OFTHE INFORMATION SOCIETY, 136-39, 192-200 (1996); James Boyle, Intellectual Property Poliy On-Line:
A Young Person's Guide, 10 HARV.J.L. &TECH. 47 (1996); James Boyle, Sold Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996,
at EIS; James Boyle, Q Is Congress Turning the Inteme into an Inforntion Toll Road?, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS,
Jan. 15, 1996, at 24; James Boyle, A Politics ofIntellectual Property: Environmentalismfor the Ve4 DUKE LJ.
(forthcoming). The editors of the Universiy ofCininati Law Rie= were kind enough to allow me to address
myself in this Article to a slightly different issue, though one of profound importance to the Symposium as
a whole-the extent to which state regulation of the Internet is possible at all, and the costs and benefits
of technical solutions. In the course of that discussion, I use a number of examples drawn from the recent
proposals on Internet copyright.
1. Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977, 78,103-05 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon et al.
trans., 1980).
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I make the familiar criticism that digital libertarianism is inadequate
because of its blindness to the effects of private power, and the less
familiar claim that digital libertarianism is also surprisingly blind to the
state's own power in cyberspace. In fact, I argue that the conceptual
structure and jurisprudential assumptions of digital libertarianism lead
its practitioners to ignore the ways in which the state can often use
privatized enforcement and state-backed technologies to evade some of
the supposed practical (and constitutional) restraints on the exercise of
legal power over the Internet. Finally, I argue that technological
solutions which provide the keys to the first two phenomena are neither
as neutral nor as benign as they are currently perceived to be. Some of
my illustrations will come from the Clinton administration's proposals
for Internet copyright regulation, others from the Communications
Decency Act (CDA)2 and the cryptography debate. In the process, I
make opportunistic and unsystematic use of the late Michel Foucault's
work to criticize some of the jurisprudential orthodoxy of the Internet.
II. THE INTERNET TRINITY
For a long time, the Internet's enthusiasts have believed that it would
be largely immune from state regulation. The theory was not so much
that nation states would not want to regulate the Internet, it was that
they would be unable to do so, forestalled by the technology of the medium,
the geographical distribution of its users, and the nature of its content. This
tripartite immunity came to be a kind of "Internet Holy Trinity"; faith
in it was a condition of acceptance into the community. Indeed, the
ideas I am about to discuss are so well known on the Internet that they
have actually acquired the highest status that a culture can confer: they
have become cliches.
A. "The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it."
This quote fromJohn Gilmore,' one of the founders of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, has the twin advantages of being pithy and
2. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West Supp. 1997).
3. There are a variety of versions of the claim but the content is pretty consistent. See, e.g.,
John P. Barlow, Parsing the Buck on Porn (visited June 24, 1996)
<http://www.cff.org/pub/Publications/john-Perry--Barlow/HTML/pom-and-responsibility.html>
('The Internet, in the words of... John Gilmore, 'deals with censorship as though it were a malfunction
and routes around it."'); Judith Lewis, Whyl ohnny Can't Surf, LAWKLY., Feb. 21, 1997, at 43. ("Mt's not
easy to push standards of 'decency' on a network that, as.. .John Gilmore allegedly put it (though even
he can't remember where), treats censorship as damage and mutes around it.").
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technologically accurate. The Internet was originally designed to
survive a nuclear war; its distributed architecture and its technique of
packet switching were designed to get messages delivered despite
blockages, holes, and malfunctions." Imagine the poor censor faced with
such a system. There is no central exchange to seize and hold;
messages actively "seek out" alternative routes so that even if one path
is blocked another may open up. Here was the civil libertarian's dream:
a technology with a comparatively low cost of entry to speakers and
listeners alike, technologically resistant to censorship, yet politically and
economically important enough that it cannot easily be ignored. The
Internet offers obvious advantages to the countries, research
communities, cultures, and companies that use it, but it is extremely
hard to control the amount and type of information available; access is
like a tap that only has two settings-"off' and "full." For govern-
ments, this has been seen as one of the biggest problems posed by the
Internet. To the Internet's devotees, most of whom embrace some
variety of libertarianism, the Internet's structural resistance to censor-
ship, or any externally imposed filtration, is "not a bug but a feature."
B. "In Cyberspace, the First Amendment is a local ordinance. "
5
To the technological obstacles the Internet raises against externally
imposed content filtration, one must add the geographic obstacles raised
by its global extent. Because a document can be retrieved as easily from
a server five-thousand miles away or a server five miles away,
geographical proximity and content availability are independent of each
other. If the king's writ reaches only as far as the king's sword, then
much of the content on the Internet might be presumed to be free from
the regulation of any particular sovereign.
The libertarian culture that dominates the Internet at present posits
that state intervention into private action is only necessary to prevent the
infliction of harm. Seeing the Internet as a speech-dominated realm of
human activity in which harm would be comparatively hard to inflict,
libertarians have been even more resistant to state regulation of the
4. See generally Todd Flaming, An Introduction to the Internet, 83 ILL. Bj., 311, (1995); JOSHUA
EDDINGS, HOWTHE INTERNET WORKS 13 (1994); Bruce Sterling, Short Histoiy ofthe Internet (last modified
Feb. 1993) <gopher://gopher.metronet.com:70/00/inet/A..Short..History-oLthejntemet>. For
background information on Internet legal issues, see generally Lawrence Lessig, The Zones Of Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L REV. 1403 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Path Of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE Lj. 1743 (1995); David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-the Rise Of Law In Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
5. See, e.g., John P. Barlow, Leaving the Physical World (visited June 24, 1997)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Publicadons/john-Perty-Barlow/HTML/leaving-the-physica-world.html>
(discussing the inapplicability of physical-world standards in cyberspace).
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digital environment than of the disdainfully named, "meatspace."
"Sticks and stones can break my bones but bytes can never hurt me," or
so goes their assumption. 'Thus; the postulate that a global Internet
cannot be regulated by national governments has been seen as an
unequivocally positive thing.
John Perry Barlow's description of the First Amendment as a local
ordinance offers the sobering reminder that it is not merely "bad" state
traditions, interventions, and regulations that are enfeebled by
cyberspace. There is a difference between speech being constitutionally
protected and practically immune from regulation; a free speech
tradition that pins all of its hopes on physical immunity from regulation
is likely to be particularly vulnerable if that immunity proves illusory.
C. "Information Wants to be Free."
To a person interested in political theory, one of the most striking
things about the Internet is the instability of its political cartography.
We divide our world up into contiguous and opposing terr-
itories-public and private, property and sovereignty, regulation and
laissez faire-solving problems by deciphering their placement on this
map. In the everyday world, these divisions seem comparatively solid
and lumpish, even if clever academic critics may harp on their
theoretical indeterminacy. On the Internet, things are different.
Concepts and political forces seem to be up for grabs. Nothing
illustrates this point better than the debate over intellectual property on-
line. In the digital environment, is intellectual property just property,
the precondition to an unregulated market, just another example of the
rights that libertarians believe the state was specifically created to
protect? Or is intellectual property actually public regulation, artificial
rather than natural, an invented monopoly imposed by a sovereign state,
a distorting and liberty-reducing intervention in an otherwise free
domain?
Although it would be hard to find anyone who believes entirely in
either of these two stereotypes, recognizable versions of both do exist in
the debate over intellectual property and-more interestingly-can be
found across the political spectrum. George Gilder of the conservative
Manhattan Institute, a fervent booster of capitalism and laissez faire
economics, has shown considerable skepticism about intellectual
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property.' Peter Huber, from the same conservative think tank, has
pronounced it the very acme of liberty, privacy, and natural right.7 The
Clinton administration attempted to extend intellectual property rights
6. One of the strongest statements of his position comes in the manifesto he co-authored with a
number of other prominent members of the digerati:
Unlike the mass knowledge of the Second Wave-public good knowledge that was useful
to everyone because most people's information needs were standardized-Third Wave
customized knowledge is by nature a private good.
If this analysis is correct, copyright and patent protection ofImowledge (or at Last many forns
of it) may no longer be necessary. In fact, the marketplace may already be creating vehicles to
compensate creators of customized knowledge outside the cumbersome copyright/patent
process, as suggested byJohn Perry Barlow.
Esther Dyson, et al., A Magna Cartaforthe KnowledgeAge, 11 NEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY 26, 29 (1994)
(emphasis added).
7. Huber, in fact, took a direct shot at the notion that "information wants to be free." See Peter
Huber, Tangked 1rres: The Intellctual Confusion and Hypocrisy of the Wired Crowd, SLATE, Oct. 18, 1996
<http://www.slate.com/Features/TangledWires/TangledWires.asp>. In this article, Huber labeled the
intellectual property rights skeptics as hypocrites whose real attitude reflects a desire for liberal
redistribution of everyone else's stuff. See id His views are frankly dismissive and puzzlingly so. He
criticized a group of people with widely varying political views, linked mainly by an opposition to the
expansion of intellectual property rights. Some have argued in favor of maintaining the existing intellectual
property rules in cyberspace, others have claimed that reliance on rules rather than technological
innovation would actually inhibit the operation of capitalism on-line. Yet Huber's description of this
"Wired Crowd," many of whom make Ayn Rand sound like Vladimir Ilyich, is that their position is that
of a hypocritical New Dealer-"My property is mine; yours is for sharing." Id. Wired, we are supposed
to believe, is the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in cyberspace. (Would that it were true! In fact,
Wird's ideal of scathing social commentary is to claim that someone's computer is out of date.) Huber then
seeks to restore normative appeal to intellectual property by arguing that it "isjust a commercial form of
privacy law. Indeed for some, it's the only kind of privacy they still own." Id. This powerful argument
suffers a little from the example that follows. "Madonna can no longer stop you from gazing at her breasts.
Copyright at least makes you pay for the pleasure." Id. Our sympathies are with her (and with him if this
is the best illustration that comes to mind.) Stopping the world from gazing at her breasts has never seemed
to be particularly high on Madonna's list of priorities-at least as a matter of "privacy." True, Madonna
might prefer a legal regime that would allow her to wring the maximum commercial advantage in every
market for images of her and references to her-by making people like Huber pay if they wished to use her
as an example, restricting the fair use privilege, or limiting news reporting and biography to authorized
images. Yet it is not clear why this desire, in itself, makes the notion of such a regime normatively
compelling as a matter of social policy. There is also a danger in labeling critics of extensive intellectual
property rights "anti-privacy." If there is a privacy interest consisting solely in the extraction of the
maximum rent for one's intellectual property, then was the Justice Department's investigation of Microsoft's
allegedly anticompetitive practices an attempt to cut down on Bill Gates's privacy interest in Windows '95?
Or are we referring simply to spin-off effects in a particular case? Are federal automobile emissions
standards "anti-privacy" if they make it harder for me to leave the paparazzi in the dust? Surely one must
distinguish occasional opportunistic uses of a right from the underlying purposes of that right? We have
all used things for other than their intended purpose. Intellectual property can sometimes be used to
preserve privacy and I have used a stout and WASP-y pair of wingtips to hammer in a nail; this does not
mean that the manufacturers of Birkenstock sandals are "anti-carpentry." There are indeed profound and
interesting linkages and tensions between property and privacy, and this point has been made for some
time. Compare Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890),
with Michael Madow, Private Ownership ofPub/i Imag" Popu/ar Culture and Pubiciy Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125
(1993). Yet, as these articles both show, intellectual property most definitely is not 'just a commercial form
of privacy law."
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on-line,8 and has been roundly criticized by both civil liberties groups
and right wing intellectuals.9 This is not just a disagreement as to tactics
among people who might be said to share the same ideology: it is a
fundamental set of disputes over the very social construction and
normative significance of a particular phenomenon-as if the
Libertarian party couldn't agree on whether its motto was to be
"Taxation is theft" or "Property is theft." In this contested terrain,
Stewart Brand's phrase, "information wants to be free," marks out the
territory of those who are skeptical of both the need for, and the utility
of restraints on the flow of information and who frequently extend that
skepticism to intellectual property rights.
As a phrase, "information wants to be free,"'" has sufficiently
penetrated the culture that it is now actually parodied in advertisements.
Yet its ubiquitous nature may work to conceal the claims that it makes.
John Perry Barlow began his famous essay, "Selling Wine Without
Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the Global Net," with this quote
from Thomas Jefferson:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an
idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps
it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the
possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of
it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because
every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from
me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That
ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the
moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed
by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space,
without lessening their density at any point, and like the air in which
we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of
confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in
nature, be a subject of property."
8. See eraffy INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTE ICTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Sept. 1995).
9. SeeJames Boyle, Intellctual Property Poticy On-Line: A Young Person's Guide, 10 HARv.J.L. & TECH.
47, 52 (1996).
10. John P. Barlow, Selling Wine Wirhout Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the Global Net, WIRED 2.03
1993, at 86 (visited June 24, 1997) <http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/John_-Perry.-Bar-
low/HTML/idea.economy-article.html> (crediting Stewart Brand with the statement).
11. Id. (quoting THOMASJEFFERSON, 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 333-34 (Albert
E. Bergh ed., Monticello ed., Thomas Jefferson Memorial Ass'n 1904) (letter from Jefferson to Isaac
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The quotation expresses perfectly the mixture of Enlightenment
values and upbeat, public-goods theory that typifies Internet analysis of
information flows. Information is costless to copy, should be spread
widely, and cannot be confined. Beyond the Jeffersonian credo lies a kind
of Darwinian anthropomorphism. Information really does want to be
free. John Perry Barlow credited Brand's phrase with "recognizing both
the natural desire of secrets to be told and the fact that they might be
capable of possessing something like a 'desire' in the first place."12
Barlow continued:
English biologist and philosopher Richard Dawkins proposed the idea
of "memes," self-replicating, patterns of information which propagate
themselves across the ecologies of mind, saying they were like life
forms.
I believe they are life forms in every respect but a basis in the
carbon atom. They self-reproduce, they interact with their
surroundings and adapt to them, they mutate, they persist. Like any
other life form they evolve to fill the possibility spaces of their local
environments, which are, in this case the surrounding belief systems
and cultures of their hosts, namely, us.
.Indeed, the sociobiologists like Dawkins make a plausible case that
carbon-based life forms are information as well, that, as the chicken
is an egg's way of making another egg, the entire biological spectacle
is just the DNA molecule's means of copying out more information
strings exactly like itself.'3
Viewed through this lens, the Internet is the ultimate natural
environment for information; trying to regulate the Internet is like
trying to prohibit evolution.
Taken together, the three quotations assert that the technology of the
medium, the geographical distribution of its users, and the nature of its
content all make the Internet specially resistant to state regulation. The
state is too big, too slow, and too geographically and technically limited
to regulate a global citizenry's fleeting interactions over a mercurial
medium. Though I do not subscribe to the full-throated versions of any
of these slogans, I have sympathy with each of them. It does excite me
that the Internet is highly resistant to externally imposed content
filtration, although I tend to worry about structural private filters as well
as command-based public filters, and I also recognize that speech and
information can and will produce harm as well as good. I do think that
the global nature of the Internet is, by and large, a positive thing, though
McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813)).
12. Id
13. Id
1997]
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we need to pay more attention to things like the cost of the technology
required to play the game, or the effects on workers of a networked
economy in which companies can relocate around the world and find
a new on-line workforce in an afternoon. 4 Finally, I am optimistic
about the historical conjunction of technologies based on nearly costless
copying and a political tradition that treats information in a more
egalitarian way than other resources.15 It is possible, of course, to
conjure up a world in which rampant info-kleptocracy undermines
scientific and artistic development. I have argued elsewhere that the
main danger is not that information will be unduly free, but that
intellectual property rights will become so extensive that they will
actually stifle innovation, free speech, and educational potential. In any
event, I want to set aside my agreement or disagreement with the values
behind the Internet catechism, and focus instead on the factual and legal
assumptions on which it relies. My argument is that info-libertarians
should not be so quick to write off the state. In fact, I argue that the
work of the distinctively nondigital philosopher, Michel Foucault,
provides some suggestive insights into the ways in which power can be
exercised on the Internet and the reasons why much contemporary
analysis is so dismissive of the power of law and the state.
III. FOUCAULT & THEJURISPRUDENCE OF DIGITAL
LIBERTARIANISM
When "Netizens" think of law, they tend to conjure up a positivist,
even Austinian, image: 6 law is a command backed by threats, issued by
14. Global, lightspeed mobility of labor is not something that Adam Smith had contemplated; is it
a quantitative or a qualitative distinction?
15. SeeJAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY at 182-83 (1996) ("To someone like me, who believes a lot of our social ills
come from the restriction of egalitarian norms, [the] fact [that our current ideas about information have
strong egalitarian underpinnings] has an optimistic ring."); see also Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and IWhat
It Wdl Do, 104 YALE LJ. 1805, 1847 (1995).
[I]he [Supreme] Court has based its jurisprudence on an idealized view of the world, a view
that doesn't quite correspond to the world in which we live .... [T]his idealized
world ... is much closer to the electronic media world of the future than it is to the print
and broadcast media world of the present. If my predictions are right, the new technologies
will make it much easier for all ideas, whether backed by the rich or the poor, to participate
in the marketplace .... [D]uring the print age, the Supreme Court created a First
Amendment for the electronic age. The fictions the Court found necessary to embrace are
turning, at least in part, into fact.
Id.; cf. C. Edwin Baker, New Media Technologies, the First Amendment and Public Policy, 1 Communications
Review 315 (1996) (arguing that Volokh's view reduces the First Amendment to the marketplace of ideas
theory that, in fact, represents only a part of First Amendment doctrine and theory).
16. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Isaiah Berlin, et al. eds.,
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a sovereign who acknowledges no superior, directed to a geographically
defined population which renders that sovereign habitual obedience. 7
Thus, Netizens think of the state's law as a blunt instrument, incapable
of imposing its will on the global subjects of the Internet and their
evanescent and geographically unsituated transactions. Indeed, if there
was ever a model of law designed to fail at regulating the Internet, it is
the Austinian model. Fortunately or unfortunately for the Internet,
however, the Austinian model is both crude and inaccurate. That is
where the work of the late Michel Foucault comes in.
Michel Foucault was one of the most interesting postwar French
philosophers and social theorists. His work was wide-ranging,
sometimes obscure,' 8 indeed deliberately so, and his historical
generalizations would have been insufferable if they were not so often
provocatively useful. 9 Above all, Foucault possessed a knack for posing
problems in a new way-reorienting the inquiry in a way that was
1954); see alsoJames Boyle, Thomas Hobbes and the Invented Tradition of Pos"tL Reflections on Language, Power,
and Essentiaism, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 383 (1987).
17. The overwhelmingly libertarian cast.to Internet politics in the United States might provide an
explanation for this view. Libertarians tend to concentrate on state power rather than private power, and
focus on the obvious restraints on freedom imposed by criminal law's impact against the citizen, rather than
the subtler restraints imposed by the rules constituting and structuring market and other relationships. Both
ideas fit the Austinian image. By making a criminal statute the paradigm of the exercise of state power, and
the citizen's right against the government the paradigm of its fimikn, the libertarians code their normative
ideas about political problems and solutions into the very image of law itself.
18. Foucault wrote:
You will recall my work here, such as it has been .... None of it does more than mark time.
Repetitive and disconnected, it advances nowhere. Since indeed it never ceases to say the
same thing, it perhaps says nothing. It is tangled up into an indecipherable, disorganised
muddle. In a nutshell, it is inconclusive.
Still, I could claim that after all these were only trails to be followed, it mattered little
where they led; indeed, it was important that they did not have a predetermined starting
point and destination. They were merely lines laid down for you to pursue or to divert
elsewhere, or re-design as the case might be. They are, in the final analysisjust fragments,
and it is up to you or me to see what we can make of them. For my part, it has struck me
that I might have seemed a bit like a whale that leaps to the surface of the water disturbing
it momentarily with a tiny jet of spray and lets it be believed, or pretends to believe, or wants
to believe, or himself does in fact believe, that down in the depths where no one sees him
any more, where he is no longer witnessed nor controlled by anyone, he follows a more
profound, coherent and reasoned trajectory. Well, anyway, that was more or less how I at
least conceived the situation; it could be that you perceived it differently.
Foucault, supra note 1, at 78-79.
19. Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-
STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141, 141-160 (osue V. Harari ed., 1979); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE
AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OFTHE PRISON (Alan Sheridan cd. & trans., 1979) [hercinafter FOUCAULT].
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manifestly helpful for those who followed. Thinkers whose politics and
methodology are very far from Foucault's own have testified to this
facility.2"
From the point of view of this Article, one of Foucault's most
interesting contributions was to challenge a particular notion of power,
power-as-sovereignty, and to juxtapose against it a vision of
"surveillance" and "discipline."2 At the heart of this project was a
belief that both our analyses of the operation of political power and our
strategies for its restraint or limitation were inaccurate or misguided. In
a series of essays and books Foucault argued that, rather than the public
and formal triangle of sovereign, citizen, and right, we should focus on
a series of subtler private, informal, and material forms of coercion
organized around the concepts of surveillance and discipline. The
paradigm for the idea of surveillance was the Panopticon, Bentham's
plan for a prison constructed in the shape of a wheel around the hub of
an observing warden. At any moment the warden might have the
prisoner under observation through a nineteenth century version of the
closed-circuit TV.22 ' Unsure when authority might in fact be watching,
the prisoner would strive always to conform his behavior to its presumed
desires. Bentham had hit upon a behavioralist equivalent of the
superego, formed from uncertainty about when one was being observed
by the powers that be. The echo of contemporary laments about the
"privacy-free state" is striking. To this, Foucault added the notion of
discipline-crudely put, the multitudinous private methods of regulation
of individual behavior ranging from workplace time-and-motion
efficiency directives to psychiatric evaluation."
20. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 23, 182 (1992) (describing Foucault's writings
on sexuality as "remarkable" and "eloquent").
21. FOUCAULT, supra note 19.
22. SeeJANEr SEMPLE, BENTHAM'S PRISON: A STUDY OFTHE PANOPTICON PENITENTIARY (1993).
The two writers to have used Foucault's ideas most notably in the legal privacy and cyberspace context are
J.M. Balkin, hkalt is a Postmodern Constitutionalisrm, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1987 (1992), and Larry Lessig,
Reading the Cons itudion in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869,895 (1996) (citing FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON, supra note 19, at 139-40).
23. In many ways, Foucault himself was most interested in a portion of this analysis that I shall
pursue here only episodically. In a series of works on penology and the treatment of insanity, he argued
that the emergence of the academic and intellectual "disciplines" as we know them now is reciprocally
linked in important ways to this minute and quotidian regulation of behavior. At the same time, retrofitting
some of his earlier work on the human sciences into this new theoretical mold, he suggested that our
conception of"an individual" was not some naturally occurring fact of nature from which analyses could
begin, but instead, in part, a result of the concatenation of discipline and surveillance. Elsewhere I have
explored the connections between power and knowledge on the one hand, see James Boyle, 77Te Politics of
Reason: Critical Legal 7eoy and Local Socal Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985), and the effects of the
construction of subjectivity on the other, see James Boyle, Is Subjecviy Possible? The Poshnodem Subject in Legal
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Foucault pointed out the apparent conflict between a formal language
of politics organized around relations between sovereign and citizen,
expressed through rules backed by sanctions, and an actual experience
of power being exercised through multitudinous non-state sources, often
dependent on material or technological means of enforcement. Writing
in a manner that managed to be simultaneously coy and sinister,
Foucault suggested that there was something strange going on in the
coexistence of these two systems:
Impossible to describe in the terminology of the theory of sovereignty
from which it differs so radically, this disciplinary power ought by
rights to have led to the disappearance of the grand juridical edifice
created by that theory. But in reality, the theory of sovereignty has
continued to exist not only as an ideology of right, but also to provide
the organising principle of the legal codes ....
Why has the theory of sovereignty persisted in this
fashion ... ? For two reasons, I believe. On the one hand, it has
been.., a permanent instrument of criticism of the monarchy and all
the obstacles that can thwart the development of a disciplinary society.
But at the same time, the theory of sovereignty, and the organisation
of a legal code centered upon it, have allowed a system of right to be
superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to
conceal its actual procedures .... 24
Foucault was not writing about the Internet. He was not even writing
about the twentieth century. But his words provide a good starting
place from which to examine the catechism of Internet inviolability.
They are a good starting point precisely because, when viewed within
the discourse of sovereign "commands backed by threats" aimed at a
defined territory and population, the Internet does indeed look almost
invulnerable. Things look rather different when viewed from the
perspective of"a type of power which is constantly exercised by means
of surveillance rather than in a discontinuous manner by means of a
system of levies or obligations distributed over time [and which]....
presupposes a tightly knit grid of material coercions rather than the
physical existence of a sovereign." 25 What is more, there is a sense in
which the "system of right [is] superimposed upon the mechanism of
discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures ... ,, 26 The
jurisprudence of digital libertarianism is not simply inaccurate; it may
Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489 (1991). Although there are interesting things to be said about the
construction of subjectivity in cyberspace, my goal here is more mundane.
24. Foucault, supra note 1, at 105.
25. Id at 104.
26. Id at 105.
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actually obscure our understanding of what is going on. Thus, even the
digerati may find the analysis that follows of interest, if only to see how
far the Internet can be made to treat censorship as a feature not a bug,
how far local ordinances may reach in cyberspace, and how
information's desire for freedom may be curbed.
The examples I will give are drawn from different areas of regulation
of communications technology. Some of them deal explicitly with the
Internet-the CDA, the proposed National Information Infrastructure
(NII) Copyright Protection Act, and the regulation of cryptography.
Others are directed towards technologies outside of the Internet, at least
for the present-the V-chip, the Clippe'r Chip, digital telephony, and
digital audio recorders. All of them share one thing--the state has
worked actively to embed or hardwire the legal regime in the technology
itself.27 In most of them, the exercise of power is much more a matter
of the quotidian shaping and surveillance of activity than of imposing
sanctions after the fact. Yet these examples also present revealing
differences, illustrating a range of goals, tactics, and results. Sometimes
technology has been mandated by legislation, sometimes facilitated
through state-sanctioned, standard-setting bodies. Sometimes the legis-
lation defines technological safe harbors to sanctions that would other-
wise apply, and sometimes the state uses the power of the purse to create
a de facto standard by refusing to purchase any equipment that does not
conform to the desired technical' or legal standards. I will begin with the
CDA, turn to the use of strict liability and digital fences in Internet
copyright policy, and conclude with a sampler of hardwired regulation
drawn from a number of areas of communications technology.
27. The best chronicler of the role of hard and softwired legal regimes is Lawrence Lessig. He wrote:
I don't take issue with the values inherent in any one particular system of code. My
criticism is directed against those who think about cyber regulation solely in terms of "law."
Laws affect the pace of technological change, but the strictures of software can do even more
to curtail freedom. In the long run, the shackles built by programmers may we constrain
us most.
Cyber Rights Now: Tyranny in dthInfastrucsa, WIRED 5:07 (July 1997) <http://www.wired. com/wired/5.07
/cyber_.rights.html>; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1408 (1996)
("In the well implemented system, there is no civil disobedience. Law as code is a start to the perfect
technology ofjustice."). I discovered during the writing of this piece that Lessig's most recent paper comes
even closer to my concerns here. See Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech, (visited October 22,
1997), <http://www.si.umich.edu/-prie/tprc/abstracts97/lessig.pdf ">. Jonathan Weinberg's work
provides a thoughtful description of the techniques and consequences of various Internet rating systems.
SeeJonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 453 (1997). Julie Cohen has
provided a very thought-provoking analysis of the significance of technologically hardwired regimes in the
context of intellectual property law in Julie Cohen, Reverse Enginenzzg and the Rise of Electronic Viilantism:
Intellectual Froperty Implications of "Lock-out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1091 (1995), and of the
jurisprudential assumptions of the supporters of hardwiring, inJulie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, (visited
October 22, 1997) <http://wvw.si.umich.edu/-prie/tprc/abstracts97/0 Il.txt>.
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IV. SAFE HARBORS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The CDA has been hailed as the nadir of congressional regulation of
communications technology. Badly drafted, inconsistently worded,28
and palpably unconstitutional, it appeared to most of the Internet
community to be a case of technological ignorance run rampant.
Congress regulated what it did not understand, and did so in a way that
would be practically futile because of the amount of content that came
from beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. The reactions ranged
from condescending amusement at the lack of Congress's technological
knowledge, to proprietary anger that the state was overtly asserting its
power over the electronic frontier. "Keep your laws off our Net," went
the slogan.
When the CDA was struck down by two different three-judge panels29
and then by a unanimous Supreme Court,3" the decisions were seen as
an inevitable vindication of these libertarian views. The victory was
only sweetened when the lower court opinions pointed out that some of
the CDA's constitutional problems came from its practical inability to
reach much of the content on the Internet. Federal judges had come a
long way towards recognizing both the technological resistance of the
Internet to censorship, and the fact that a global net could never be
28. Compare 47 U.S.C.A. §223(a)(l)(A)(ii) ("obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent") with
§223(a)(l)(B)(ii) ("obscene or indecent") and §223(d)(l)(B) ("in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards"). Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. §223 (West
Supp. 1997). None of these terms is defined, and it is not clear that they are intended to be distinct from
each other. With some reservations, the courts that have scrutinized the Communications Decency Act
(CDA) have treated both phrases as equivalent to "indecency" as defined in Pacifka. FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The Supreme Court was less willing to waive away the statute's internal
inconsistencies:
Regardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment, the many
ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render it problematic for purposes of the
First Amendment. For instance, each of the two parts of the CDA uses a different linguistic
form. The first uses the word "indecent," while the second speaks of material that "in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs." Given the absence of a
definition of either term, this difference in language will provoke uncertainty among
speakers about how the two standards relate to each other and just what they mean.
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997) (citations omitted). Perhaps in desperation the government
ended up by declaring that the CDA was intended to regulate only "commercial pornography," a phrase
that appears nowhere within it. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 854-55 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
29. SeeACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824. In striking down the CDA, the district court held that, "0]ust as
the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony
of the unfettered speech the First Amendment protects. For these reasons, I without hesitation hold that
the CDA is unconstitutional on its face." Id at 883 (Dalzel,J., concurring).
30. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329.
UNIVERSITY OF CIA'CLIlNA T7 LA WREVIEW [Vol.66
effectively regulated by a single national jurisdiction." Thus, two of the
three parts of the Internet Trinity had been acknowledged in the federal
reporters. What is more, they had actually been plugged into the
framework of conventional First Amendment analysis. Given the fact
that the CDA was likely to be ineffective, could we possibly say that it
passed strict First Amendment scrutiny?32 Was this not a case of
substantially restricting the freedom of speech without effectively
achieving the compelling state interest?
Seen through the lens provided by the jurisprudence of digital
libertarianism, these reactions were entirely warranted. A command
backed by threats, uttered by a sovereign, and directed towards a
geographically defined population had met and been annihilated by a
right held by citizens against intrusion by state power, in part, because
of the sovereign's inability to regulate those outside its borders. The
CDA vanishes as if it had never been--an utter failure. Yet this analysis
misses the developments surrounding the CDA, not the public criminal
sanction, but rather the shaping and development of privately deployed,
materially based, technological methods of surveillance and censorship.
The CDA aimed to protect minors from indecent material. However,
if it did so by substantially limiting the speech of adults, it would be held
unconstitutional as overbroad; in the words of Justice Frankfurter,
"burning down the house to roast the pig."33 The CDA's answer to this
problem was to create safe harbors for indecent, but constitutionally
protected speech aimed at adults, provided that speech was kept from
the eyes of minors.34 The CDA offered a number of methods to achieve
this goal, such as "requiring [the] use of a verified credit card, debit
account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number."35
Given the technology and economics of the Internet, however, the most
important safe harbor for nonprofit organizations was clearly going to
be that provided by § 223(e)(5)(A), which offered immunity to those who
3 1. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 824 (discussing findings of fact). "There is no centralized storage
location, control point, or communications channel for the Intemet, and it would not be technically feasible
for a single entity to control all of the information conveyed on the Interet." Id. But cf ACLU Cyber-
Uberties, Transcript of Supreme Court Oral Argument, Reno v. ACLU, Oral Argument of BruceJ. Ennis
(visitedJune 24, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/trial/sctran.html> (statement of ChiefJustice
Rehnquist) ("But if 70 percent [of indecent speech on the Internet] is shielded and 30 percent isn't, what
kind of an argument is that against the constitutionality of the statute?").
32. Charles Nesson & David Marglin, 77m Day Lim Intermt Met the Frst Amedme- Tme and the
Communications LiecnyAct, 10 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 113, 115 (1996).
33. Buderv. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,383 (1957), quoted in Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 127 (1989).
34. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
35. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(B).
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had used "any method which is feasible under available technology."36
It is here that the irony begins. When the CDA was first proposed,
a number of computer scientists and software engineers decided that
they would do something more than merely rail against its
unconstitutionality. They were convinced that an answer to the
perceived need for regulation could be met within the language of the
Internet itself." I am not using the phrase, "language of the Internet"
as part of some deconstructive or Saussurean trope-the idea was
literally to provide a filtering system built into the same language that
makes the World Wide Web possible: Hyper Text Markup Language
(HTML). Conceiving of technical solutions as intrinsically more
desirable than the exercise of state power by a sovereign, as facilitators
of private choice rather than threats of public sanction, they offered an
alternative designed to show that the CDA was, above all, unnecessary.
This technological alternative to the CDA, called the Platform for
Internet Content Selection (PICS), allows tags rating a web page to be
embedded within "meta-file" information provided by the page about
itself.8 PICS can be adapted to provide both first party and third party
content labeling and rating.39 The system is touted as value neutral
because it could be used to promote any value-system. Sites could be
rated for violence, for sexism, for adherence to some particular religious
belief, indeed for any set of criteria that was thought worthwhile. The
third party filtering site could be the Christian Coalition, the National
Organization for Women, or the Society for Protecting the Manifest
Truths of Zoroastrianism. Of course in practice, we might believe that
the PICS technology would be disproportionately used to favor a
particular set of ideas and values and exclude others, just as we might
believe that in practice, a Lochner regime of "free contract" would
actually favor some groups and hurt others, despite the fact that each
36. 47 U.S.C.A. §223(e)(5)(A). The statute provides:
(5) It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(B) or (d) of this section, or under
subsection (a)(2) of this section with respect to the use of a facility for an activity under
subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section that a person-
(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the
circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication specified in such
subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such
communications, including any method which is feasible under available technology ....
47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(A).
37. See Paul Resnick &Jim Miller, The CDA's Silver Lining, WIRED, Aug. 1996, at 109.
38. See generally Platform for Internet Content &lection: What Does It Do? (visited June 24, 1997)
<http://www.w3.org/PICS/951030/AV/StartHere.html>.
39. Self-rating israting provided by the person posting the information. Third party rating is rating
provided by some other entity. World Wide Web Consortium, PICS Statement of Principle (visitedJune 24,
1997) <http://www.w3.org/PICS/principles.html>.
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is-on its face-value neutral. However, as Owen Fiss,Jack Balkin, and
Richard Delgado have each pointed out (though in very different
contexts), this kind of legal realist insistence on looking at actual effects,
and scrutinizing actual, rather than formal power, is much rarer in the
context of the First Amendment than it is in private law."
While PICS and a variety of other systems offered a technical solution
at the "speaker" end of the connection, other software programs also
offered technical solutions at the "listener" end. These programs would
not offer speakers a safe harbor from the reach of the CDA. Rather,
they "empowered" computer users to protect their families from
unwanted content by using software filters, thus raising in civil
libertarians' hearts the hope that the whole Act was unnecessary.
Programs such as SurfWatch, CyberPatrol, NetNanny, and CyberSitter
blocked access to unsuitable material and did so without the need for
constant parental intervention.4' Typically, these programs maintained
a list of forbidden sites as well as a text-search filter, which would not
load documents containing forbidden strings of words.
The irony that I mentioned is that these technical solutions were used
by both sides in the dispute over the CDA. Those challenging the CDA
40. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1424-25 (1986).
Today abolition of the fairness doctrine can be passed off as just one more instance of
"deregulation." It seems to me, however, that there is much to regret in this stance of the
Court and the [First Amendment] Tradition upon which it rests. The received Tradition
presupposes a world that no longer exists and that is beyond our capacity to recall-a world
in which the principal political forum is the street corner.
IL; see also OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED (1996); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism. Legal
Realist Approaches to the FirstAmendment, 1990 DUKE LJ. 375, 427 (1990).
In assessing what constitutes substantial overbreadth or vagueness, I do not think it
inappropriate to employ common sense judgments about the way the world works.
Although the distinction between public power and private power is significant, even more
significant for me are what power relations (public or private) exist in the standard case in
which the statute operates.
Il See also Richard Delgado, First Anudment Fomai m Is Giving Way to First AmentLenm Legal Realism, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L L REV. 169,170 (1994) ('The transition to the new [legal realist] paradigm is, however, far from
complete."). But cf. Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theoty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193,
195-97 (1996).
The theoretical advances celebrated by Delgado and other progressive critics of the First
Amendment are not really advances at all. They are simply refurbished versions of
arguments used since the beginning of modem First Amendment jurisprudence to justify
government authority to control the speech (and thought) of citizens.... Moreover, despite
the different objectives of the new censors, their reasons for supporting government control
over speech are not significantly different from those of their reactionary predecessors....
The postmodem censorship theory offered by this new generation of politically progressive
legal scholars is neither progressive nor, for that matter, even "postmodern." In the end,
it isjust censorship.
Id.
41. See generally Kathryn Munro, Filtering Utilities, PC MAG., Apr. 8, 1997, at 235 (describing and
reviewing various filtering software products).
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argued that the availability of privately implemented technological
solutions meant that the CDA failed First Amendment scrutiny: clearly
it was not the least restrictive means available to achieve the objective.
"Listener-based" blocking software allowed parents to control what their
children saw while "speaker-based," or third party rating systems such
as PICS offered a private solution to the problem of rating the content
available on the Internet.
The government took the opposite position, arguing that the
availability of systems such as PICS meant that the CDA was not
overbroad. Adult speakers would not be burdened by the law because
such systems provided adequate methods for adult speakers to segregate
their indecent but protected speech from the eyes of minors. Thus, in
their eyes, the PICS scheme, developed to destroy the CDA, actually
saved it.42 The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed, though Justice
O'Connor left open the possibility that future technical developments
might change that conclusion.43 Before the decision was even handed
down, President Clinton was already signaling his political preference
for a technical solution to the question of regulating speech on-line,
talking vaguely of a "V-chip for the Internet."" Bills have already been
advanced in Congress that would require Internet service providers to
provide filtering software to customers and aim at the development of
an "E-chip. 45
42. For a fuller version of this argument, see James Boyle et al., Before th Supreme Un-Court ofthw United
Stt& (visitedJune 24, 1997) <http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/faculty/boyle/unreno.htm> (Un-Scalia,
J., dissenting).
43. Justice O'Connor wrote:
Despite this progress, the transformation ofcyberspace is not complete. Although gateway
technology has been available on the World Wide Web for some time now, it is not
available to all Web speakers, and is just now becoming technologically feasible for chat
rooms and USENET newsgroups. Gateway technology is not ubiquitous in cyberspace, and
because without it "there is no means of age verification," cyberspace still remains largely
unzoned--and unzoneable. User based zoning is also in its infancy. For it to be effective,
(i) an agreed upon code (or "tag") would have to exist; (ii) screening software or browsers
with screening capabilities would have to be able to recognize the "tag"; and (iii) those
programs would have to be widely available-and widely used-by Internet users. At
present, none of these conditions is true. Screening software "is not in wide use today" and
"only a handful of browsers have screening capabilities." There is, moreover, no agreed-
upon "tag" for those programs to recognize.
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2354 (1997) (O'ConnorJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
44. Remarks by President Clinton at Town Hall meeting in Bridgeport, W. Va. (May 22, 1997), in
33 WEEKLY COMPIIATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 758 [hereinafter President Remarks]. "[I]t
may be that what we have to do is to try to develop something like the equivalent of what we are developing
for you for television, like the V-chip .... It's technically more difficult with the Internet .... But I think
that is the answer. Something like the V-chip for televisions. And we are working on it." Id.
45. S, e.g., Communications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment Act, H.R. 1964, 105th Cong.
(1997).
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So where does on-line speech stand after the Supreme Court's
decision in Rno v. ACLU? From the perspective of the digital libertarian,
the Internet remains unregulated and the Internet Trinity, is
undisturbed. From the perspective I have been developing here, things
seem much more mixed. As the CDA was being constitutionally voided,
the technological "solutions" were proceeding apace, some because of
the CDA, some in spite of the CDA. In contrast to the extensive
attention given to CDA, much of this process was effectively insulated
from scrutiny because of the assumptions about law and state that I have
been exploring here.
PICS is a wonderful tool for content selection and, in many ways, if
one assumes a world very much like the idealized version of the
marketplace of ideas, an unthreatening and beneficial one. Yet its
technological goal-to facilitate third- and first-party rating and
blocking of content-helps to weaken the Internet's supposed resistance
to censorship at the same moment that it helps provide a filter for user-
based selection. If national networks can be more easily run through a
kind of PICS-filtered firewall, what happens to the notion that the
Internet tap can only be turned to off or full? One wonders how China,
Singapore, or Iran would choose to employ this value-neutral system.
The technological component of the Internet faith does not fall, but it
is weakened. The state may not be able to deploy Austinian sanctions
backed by threats over the Internet, but the technology provided by
PICS gives it a different arsenal of methods with which to regulate
content materially, rather than juridically--by everyday softwired
routing practices, rather than by threats of eventual sanction.
As for the listener-based software filters, they present even more
problems. Journalists studying these programs found that their list of
selected sites was problematic and, most importantly, was actually
hidden from the users.
A close look at the actual range of sites blocked by these apps shows
they go far beyond just restricting "pornography." Indeed, some
programs ban access to newsgroups discussing gay and lesbian issues
or topics such as feminism. Entire domains are restricted, such as
HotWired. Even a web site dedicated to the safe use of fireworks is
blocked.
All this might be reasonable, in a twisted sort of way, if parents
were actually aware of what the programs banned. But here's the rub:
Each company holds its database of blocked sites in the highest
security. Companies fight for market share based on how well they
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upgrade and maintain that blocking database. All encrypt that list to
protect it from prying eyes .... '
The programs turned out to ban sites ranging from the National Rifle
Association to the National Organization for Women, and did so in a
way that was often undetectable by their purchasers. Nevertheless,
enthusiasm for these programs continues unabated. As I mentioned
earlier, President Clinton has promised that the government is working
on an Internet V-chip,47 Boston city libraries are installing blocking
software on computers accessible to children, and Texas is considering
mandating that Internet access companies make copies of such
programs available to all their new customers.49 Representative Markey
introduced a bill into Congress that would require both the creation of
an "E-chip" and a provision for free or "at cost" blocking software.5° In
constitutional terms, this raises interesting questions of state action. One
of the attractions of the technical solution is often that it allows the state
to enlist private parties to accomplish that which it is forbidden to
accomplish directly. But this state action problem is merely the
constitutional incarnation of the political limitations of the jurisprudence
of digital libertarianism--its sole focus on state power, narrowly defined,
and its blindness to the technical and economic shaping, rather than the
legal sanctioning, of the communications environment.
I do not want to overstate the effect of the mindset that I am
describing. Not everyone in the digital world thinks this way.
Libertarians too, have been worried by the dangers posed by
technologically invisible filtering of communication.5' Indeed, one of
the most interesting thing about Internet politics is that it has forced
libertarians to confront some of the tensions inherent to their own ideas.
Finally, other commentators have made the points I make here, though
they also lamented the blindness imposed by an entirely libertarian
focus.52 Nevertheless, the result of the Supreme Court's decision in Reno
46. Declan B. McCullagh & Brock N. Meeks, Keys to the Klugdom (visited June 24, 1997)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/Decan-McCullagh/cwd.kys.to.th.kingdom.0796.articlc>.
47. See President Remarks, rupra note 44.
48. Geeta Anand, Library OI's limits on 'Net access; Compromise callsforfalier sojftare only on computers used
by children, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 22, 1997, at Al.
49. Marc Ferranti, Siie-Filtering Issue Goes to Stat Level, INFOWORLD, Apr. 21, 1997, at 60.
50. Communications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment Act, H.R. 1964, 105th Cong. (1997).
51. With a cavalier disregard for the problems that this raises for my thesis, some of the best
investigative reporting on, and discussion of, the politics of private technological censorship has been done
by the cyberouralist Declan McCullagh and his "Fight Censorship" discussion list. See McCullagh &
Meeks, supra note 46. In one sense, this raises the issue that I discussed earlier-the politics of the Internet
are up for grabs and the conventional categories of political ideology and theory are much more mutable
there.
52. One commentator wrote:
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v. ACLU will simply be to sharpen the turn to the kinds of filtering
devices mentioned here. It is unlikely that this will leave the Internet as
free, or the state as powerless, as the digerati seem to believe.
V. PRIVATIZED PANOPTICONS AND LEGALIZED ENCLOSURES
I have argued elsewhere that the current government proposals for
the "reform" of copyright on the Internet weigh only the costs of
cheaper copying rather than its benefits, underestimate the importance
of fair use to competition policy and free speech, fail to recognize the
unique features of both intellectual property and networked
environments, and apply bad economic analysis to an even worse
depiction of current law.53 Leaving aside the virtues or vices of these
proposals for the moment, I will focus here on the methods by which
they were to be implemented.
Enforcement is a key problem for any Internet copyright regime. The
Internet Trinity I discussed earlier would seem to apply with particular
force to the problem of policing copyright on a global distributed
network. The technology is resistant to control, the subject matter of the
regime is intangible and trivially easy to circulate, and both the content
and the people regulated by the regime are frequently beyond the
jurisdiction of the sovereign in question. The combination of these
circumstances produced a series of warnings that intellectual property
law was doomed because neither its conceptual structure nor its
enforcement mechanism could survive "being digital."54  The best
known of these warnings is also the best written:
Although many people were surprised at [the revelations in the McCullagh and Meeks
article], it was in fact completely predictable from a historical perspective. Too much
discussion of the future of unfettered electronic communications takes place in a social
vacuum, from an extremely simplistic viewpoint (I refer to this the "net.libertarian"
mindset). Because of a perspective that might be rendered "government action bad, private
action good" There's [sic] great unwillingness to think about complicated social systems, of
private parties acting as... agents of censorship.
Seth Finkelstein, Intornet Blocdng Programs and Privatized Censorship, THE ETHICAL SPECTACLE (Aug. 1996)
<http://www.spectacle.org/896/finkel.html>. I started this Article convinced that it was about the failures
of libertarianism in cyberspace. I now believe that the real question is how cyberspace will change
libertarianism. Digital libertarians show occasional willingness to admit that property rights can be
"coercive regulation" as well as the well-spring of liberty. Privacy discourse in cyberspace focuses on
excesses of private, as well as public, power. All in all, cyberspace is a hard place to maintain the most
simplistic type of libertarian definitionalism.
53. Boyle, supra note 9, at 47; BOYLE, supra note 15,at 18-20, 51-61, 162-63; James Boyle, Q: Is.
Congress tuminag the Internet into an infornation toll rad?, INSIGHT, Jan. 15, 1996; James Boyle, Sold Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996, at E15.
54. NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995).
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The riddle is this: if our property can be infinitely reproduced and
instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without
our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can we
protect it? How are we going to get paid for the work we do with our
minds? And, if we can't get paid, what will assure the continued
creation and distribution of such work?
Since we don't have a solution to what is a profoundly new kind of
challenge, and are apparently unable to delay the galloping
digitization of everything not obstinately physical, we are sailing into
the future on a sinking ship.
This vessel, the accumulated canon of copyright and patent law,
was developed to convey forms and methods of expression entirely
different from the vaporous cargo it is now being asked to carry. It is
leaking as much from within as without.
Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating are taking three forms: a
frenzy of deck chair rearrangement, stern warnings to the passengers
that if she goes down, they will face harsh criminal penalties, and
serene, glassy-eyed denial.55
If one saw these technological transformations as mainly a threat to
both the copyright owner and the enforcement power of the state, how
would one respond, particularly if one took seriously the difficulties in
policing that the Internet Trinity points out? One would try to focus on
building the regime into the architecture of transactions in the first
place-both technically and economically-rather than policing the
transactions after the fact. More concretely, one would want to escape
from the practical and legal limitations of a sovereign-citizen
relationship. Thus, one might seek out private actors involved in
providing Internet services who are not quite as mobile as the flitting
and frequently anonymous inhabitants of cyberspace. In this case, the
parties chosen were the Internet service providers. One would pin
liability on them and leave it up to them to prevent copyright
infringement through technical surveillance, tagging, and so on, and to
spread the cost of the remaining copyright infringement over all the
users of their service, rather than all the purchasers of the product in
question. By enlisting these nimbler, technologically savvy players as
one's private police, one would also gain another advantage: freedom
from some of the constitutional and other restraints that would burden
the state were it to act directly. Intrusion into privacy, automatic
scrutiny of electronic mail, and curtailment of fair use rights so as to
make sure that no illicit content was being carried would occur in the
55. Barlow, sufna note 5.
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private realm, far from the scrutiny of public law. There are advantages
to privatizing the Panopticon, it turns out.
Given all these "advantages," it is unsurprising to find that strict
liability for on-line service providers became a central feature in the
Clinton administration's "White Paper,"56 the bills implementing its
ideas, 57 and the United States proposals for the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) treaties in Geneva.' The specifics of the
White Paper were relatively simple. On-line service providers were to
be made strictly liable for copyright violations committed by their
subscribers; in part, this was done by an expansive definition of fixation
so that even holding a document in RAM as it was browsed would
constitute the creation of a copy. 59  Clearly then, the relatively more
stable versions held in a server's disk cache or stored temporarily in its
computers would count as copies. The theory also depends on the
notion that we should analogize the on-line service provider to an
innocent but infringing photo shop and, thus, impose strict liability on
the provider as a direct infringer.6" Notably, this theory was rejected by
the only court to have faced it squarely.6' In one sense, this strategy is
very similar to the use of strict liability elsewhere in the legal system, and
of course, it can be understood entirely without reference to the
Foucauldian gloss. Yet, the conventional reasons for imposing strict
liability are strikingly absent.62
56. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTEL..ECrUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 114-24 (1995) ("White Paper"); Boyle, supra note 9, at 58-11I; Niva
Elkin-Koren, Copig*ht Low and SocialDialogue on the Information Superihway: The Case Against Copyright Liability
ofBullAin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 346 (1993); Sf. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Une Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing the theory that
strict liability for Internet service providers "would chill the use of the Internet because every access
provider or user would be subject to liability when a user posts an infringing work to a Usenet newsgroup").
57. See National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act of 1995, S. 1284, 104th Cong.
(1995), H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995).
58. S&e World Intellectual Property Organization Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, CRNR/DC/94 (visited
June 26, 1997) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/94dc.htm>; see also Newsfom WIPO (visited
June 26, 1997) <http://www.hrrc.org/wiponews.html> (detailing course of deliberations during the
Diplomatic Conference).
59. See Boyle, supra note 9, at 83-94 (discussing MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d
511 (9th Cir.1993)).
60. See id. at 103-04. The alternative, of course, would be to analogize the service provider to a
business that rented copy machines with which material could be copied illegally; in that case, the business
would be liable only if it was guilty of contributory infringement.
61. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377
(N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publications, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
62. We impose strict liability on manufacturers of products for a number of reasons-one of which
is that we believe the state could not possibly inspect every product and every design in the marketplace.
Simply by forcing manufacturers to internalize the costs of injuries caused by their products, we produce
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a strong, private set of incentives that, in turn, encourages internal mechanisms of review and product
redesign. See GUIDO CAiARESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970);
see a/so Guido Calabresi, Frst Pary, Third Pary, and Product Liabilip Systems: Can Economic Analysis of Laz Tell
UsAnythingAbou Than', 69 IOWA L. REv. 833 (1984); A. MrrCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND ECONOMICS 97-106 (2d ed. 1989). Plaintiffs become private attorneys general. However, there
are striking differences between the familiar example of the use of strict liability in the product liability
setting, and the imposition of strict liability on Internet service providers. In product liability, the
conventional range of reasons for imposing strict liability on manufacturers and sellers includes a number
of assumptions. First, they are generally the cheapest cost avoiders; in other'words, they are best able to
respond to liability for damage by making changes that could prevent the damage. Second, they are
generally the best loss spreaders; in other words, they are best able to pass the cost of unavoidable or cost-
justified damage on to the appropriate group: consumers of the good in question. Last, they are generally
in an advantageous position in terms of knowledge and effective power-at least as compared to the
relatively powerless individual consumer. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-43
(1944) (TraynorJ., concurring).
In the on-line setting, none of these claims is obviously correct. In some cases service providers
may be able to prevent illicit copying relatively cheaply without imposing large social costs. On many other
occasions, however, it seems that the costs of enforcement may outweigh the benefits. To ensure that illicit
copying is not being carried on, service providers may incur, or impose, high transaction costs; they may
be forced to impose draconian restrictions on the fair use privileges of their subscribers, for example.
(Because Internet service providers would pay for all detected copyright infringements, but would not be
forced to internalize the cost to their customers of restricting fair use, the incentives would be
asymmetrically anti-consumer.) Leaving aside the efficiency costs of enforcement by service providers, there
is also the question of whether they are the cheapest cost avoider. In many cases, the party best situated
to avoid the cost of copyright infringement will be the owner of the copyright. Whether by developing
technical solutions or by fine-tuning their business plan so as to minimize the incentives to violate copyright
in the first place, copyright owners might well be the cheapest cost avoiders. If that is true, it would actually
be inefficient to allow them to rely on another party for enforcement of their rights.
Beyond the question of the cheapest cost-avoider, remains the question of best loss spreader.
Here, too, it is hard to be confident that the Internet service providers are the appropriate parties upon
which to impose liability. The economic analysts' mantra is "activities should internalize their full costs."
If the costs of a good or activity are not passed on to those who use the good or engage in the activity, then
those individuals will make inefficient choices. Thus, for example, if the price of gasoline does not reflect
the environmental damage done by gasoline, that damage becomes a negative externality, and gasoline is
inefficiently priced relative to its "true" costs. Over what group, then, should the costs (i.e., the copyright
owner's foregone profit) of illicit copying be imposed? The inquiry is a fascinating one, with more layers
than I can fully explore here. It is complicated by the fact that the costs imposed by the illicit copying of
an information good are economically different in some ways from the costs imposed by theft of material
goods. As a content provider, I can make a rational economic decision to sell my good across some cheap
but "leaky" medium, which lowers my costs of advertising and distribution and increases the numbcr of
unauthorized copies circulating. I may even believe that some of the unauthorized copies provide a benefit
to me-making my word processing program a de facto standard in the industry or establishing my band
as the best known and, therefore, increasing the market for future products. But let us leave aside the joys
of pointing out that economic analysis depends on questions of interpretation that cannot themselves be
decided according to economic criteria. There is, at the very least, strong reason to doubt that users of on-
line services, rather than purchasers of the good in question, are the appropriate group over whom the costs
of illicit copying should be spread. This would, in fact, actively undermine the competitive incentives to
companies to develop their own anticopying methods.
Finally, the asymmetry of power and knowledge that occurs when Mrs. McPherson confronts
the Buick Motor Company is by no means as clear when Microsoft wants Netcom to do its cnrorcement
work. For all of these reasons, imposing strict liability on Internet service providers does look rather
different from imposing it on manufacturers ofdefective products. If there is an advantage to this scheme,
that advantage redounds mainly to the content providers; such a plan would shift cnforcement costs fiom
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With or without Foucault, however, thinking about the use of strict
liability as an enforcement mechanism does illustrate the limitations of
the Austinian view of the state's exercise of power. Unsurprisingly
perhaps, Austin argued against strict liability and judges under the
influence of Austinian reasoning, actually declared that strict liability
was not true law.63 My central point here is not the undesirability of
strict liability for on-line service providers, though the rationale, legal
basis, and constitutionality of such a system seem doubtful to me.
Rather, I think that the possible impact of a strict liability system on
actual privacy, speech, and discourse, indicates another limitation of the
jurisprudence of digital libertarianism. Once again, the focus on public,
criminal, and sanction-backed acts by states exercising their power
direcdy tends to obscure and, therefore, to undervalue the efficacy of
efforts that rely on privatized enforcement and surveillance, cost
spreading, and the use of "material coercions rather than the physical
existence of a sovereign." 64
It is to the latter point that I now turn. One prong of the Clinton
administration's plan for copyright on the Internet depended on
enrolling private actors to act as enforcement agents in a way that
sidestepped the rights, duties, and privileges between citizen and
sovereign. The other prong depended on coating technological
anticopying devices with the authority of the law in such a way as to
change the relative powers of current copyright holders on the one
hand, and their customers and future competitors on the other. The
two most important provisions are the "circumvention of copyright
protection systems" section and the "integrity of copyright management
information" section of the NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995.65
Similar provisions were proposed by the United States during the WIPO
conference.66
These two provisions seem, initially, to be entirely unobjectionable.
The circumvention section imposes civil liability on importers,
manufacturers, and distributors of devices the primary purpose or effect
of which is to circumvent a copyright protection system. 67  The
owners and allow them to reap the benefits of the Internet without fully bearing its costs.
63. See 2JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ONJURISPRUDENCE 136 (5th ed. 1885).
64. Foucault, supra note 1, at 104.
65. See National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act of 1995, S. 1284, 104th Cong.
§§ 1201, 1202 (1995), H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. §§ 1201, 1202 (1995).
66. See World Intellectual Property Organization Treaty, Dec. 23, 1996, CRNR/DC/94 (visited
June 26, 1997) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/94dc.htm>; see also News from WIPO (visited
June 26, 1997) <http://www.hrrc.org/wiponews.html> (detailing course of deliberations during the
diplomatic conference).
67. See S. 1284, H.R. 2441, § 1203.
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management section imposes civil and criminal liability on someone who
removes or tampers with copyright management information.6 8
Obviously, technological protections are going to be an important
means through which digital intellectual property is safeguarded; these
technological protections will include, among other things, the kind of
deeply embedded information that the management information section
protects. Documents will keep track of how many times they are read
and may complain if they are read too much or by the wrong person.
Pamela Samuelson calls these texts that "rat" on you.69 Digital books
sold to one person may be encoded so that they cannot be read by
someone else on another computer. Given the possibility of documents
that have the copyright details bound into in every packet of data, and
that also check themselves to be sure that no alterations have been
made, quotation may be perceived as alteration. (Presumably Internet
service providers would also be encouraged to introduce some system of
scanning that looked for altered or unauthorized packets of data.)
The point about all of this is that there will be a continuing
technological struggle between content providers, their customers, their
competitors, and future creators. Obviously it will sometimes be in the
interest of content providers to make it as difficult as possible for citizens
to exercise their fair use rights. They will try to build technological and
contractual fences around the material that they provide, not just to
prevent its theft, but to prevent it from being used in ways that have not
been paid for, even if those uses are privileged under current intellectual
property law. They may want to stop their competitors from achieving
interoperability, or prevent their customers from selling second-hand
versions of their products. The technical means through which to do
this can be thought of as digital fences. Sometimes those fences will be
used to stop clear violations of existing rights. Sometimes they will be
used to enclose the commons or the public domain. Thus, by making
it illegal or impractical for me to go around, through, or over the fence,
the state adds its imprimatur to an act of digital enclosure. The Intemet
Trinity tells us that information wants to be free and that the thick
fingers of Leviathan are too clumsy to hold it back. The position is less
clear if that information is guarded by digital fences which themselves
are backed by a state power maintained through private systems of
surveillance and control.
68. See S. 1284, H.R. 2441, § 1203, § 1204.
69. Pamela Samuelson, Widl the Cottghl Office be Obsokle in the TwenY-First Centuy?, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. LJ. 55, 58 n.18 (1994).
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VI. A COMMUNICATIONS SAMPLER
The tendencies I have been describing here by no means end with the
CDA and the NII Copyright Protection Act. In fact, the turn to
privatized and technologically-based enforcement to avoid practical and
constitutional obstacles seems to be the rule rather than the exception.
Outside of the Internet, the most obvious example of this is the V-
chip, a device to enable parents to restrict television programming
through a "voluntary" rating system. Although the rating system is
voluntary, the device is mandated by § 551 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.70 The V-chip decodes a set of ratings agreed to by private
parties and suggested by a state-convened "private" board. It then
blocks programming that is above a ratings threshold set by parents.7'
The attractiveness of this hardwired mix of public and private decisions
can be judged by the spread of V-chip analogies: President Clinton's
"V-chip for the Intemet," and Representative Markey's "E-chip." Why
is this device so popular, not just as a device, but as a rhetorical trope?
The answer, I think, is partly provided by the characteristics outlined
here. The V-chip seems to be merely a neutral facilitator of parental
choice. The various acts of coercion involved-the government making
the television company insert the thing into the machine, the public-
private board choosing which ratings criteria will be available for
parents to use--simply disappear into the background. Finally, the
distributed privatized nature of the system promises that it might
actually work; though admittedly, state administration of the television
system poses fewer headaches than state administration of the Internet.
Another set of examples is provided by encryption policy. In the
digital era, encryption is no longer merely the stuff of spy novels. It
provides the walls, the boundaries, and the ways of preventing
unauthorized or unwanted entry. Faced with the development of a
cryptography industry, which would produce digital walls unbreakable
by the state, the government responded by attempting to legislate its
own back door. The first proposal was that the encryption of all
communications had to be made through a government designed device
known as the "Clipper Chip." Your phone, fax, or computer system
would encrypt your communication using the algorithm hardwired into
70. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551, 110 Stat. 56, 140 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303).
71. See Kristin S. Bums, Proecting the Child. The V-chip rovisions of the TecommunicatonsAct of 1996,
7 DEPAuL-LCAJ. ARTS & ENT. L. 143 (1996); David V. Scott, The V-chip Debate Bloching Television Sex,
Vtolence, and the First Amendment, 16 LOy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 143 (1996).
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the Clipper Chip. The Clipper Chip utilizes a "key escrow" system
under which the government maintains a "back door" key to decrypt all
Clipper communications; a key which is supposed to be available only
to law enforcement agencies who, most of the time, would have to get
judicial approval of their actions. After considerable controversy, use of
the Clipper Chip encryption system was declared voluntary for both the
government and the private sector.
This might seem to be a partial vindication for the digital libertarian
position. In fact, however, the Clipper Chip project continues to have
considerable influence on the domestic encryption industry because the
government has, for the most part, adopted the Clipper Chip and has
used its considerable purchasing power to make it a de facto industry
standard.72 Although the success of this method may have been
undermined by later technological development, the strategy shows the
way in which a hardwired regime might be implemented by market
power as well as legislative fiat.
One of the arguments behind the Clipper Chip was that law
enforcement agencies were merely striving to achieve the same level of
physically permissible surveillance in a world of encoded transmissions
as they currently possessed. With this as a baseline, it was obvious that
the material possibility for interception and decryption should be
hardwired into the system itself. The same argument was made
successfully over digital telephony. Realizing that new telephony
technology, such as call forwarding, cellular telephones, and digital
communications in general, presented increasing challenges to wire
tapping, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act,73 more commonly known as the "Digital Telephony
Act." At its heart, the Digital Telephony Act requires telecom-
munications companies to make "tappability" a design criteria for the
system. Everything recorded by the traditional "pen register" system,
as well as a few new categories of information, must be digitally
recorded. Under the Digital Telephony Act, information regarding a
subscriber's name, address, telephone number, telephone toll billing
72. See Howard S. Dakoff, Note, The Cloer Chip Proposal" Deciphering the Unfownded Fears that Are
WronJlu/y Deraili its Imp/lenotation, 29J. MARSHALL L. REV. 475, 482-84 (1996) (discussing the use of the
government's purchasing power to create a de facto encryption system); see also Richard L Field, 1996:
Srvey of the rear's Developments in Electronic Cash Law and the Laws Affecting Eectronic Banking in the United States,
46 AM. U.L REV. 967, 993 (1997); Ira S. Rubenstein, Expof Contls on Enqbtion So.ftare 748 PIU/COMM
309 (1996); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Aey: Cqptography, the Clper Chip, and the Constitution,
143 U. PA. L REV. 709 (1995).
73. 47 U.S.C. § 1001-10 (Supp. 1994).
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records, length of service, and the types of services utilized, are now
available to the government. 4 ,
Technologically hardwired protections have also been implemented
in order to protect intellectual property as in the Digital Audio Tape
(DAT) standard. Unlike compact disks, which until recently were "read-
only," digital audio tape technology allows users to make perfect copies
of recordings. Fearing that this ability would lead to the development
of an extensive market for copied tapes, the recording industry pushed
for mandatory technological protection, which they received in the
Audio Home Recording At of 1992."5 This Act requires all DAT
recorders to utilize the "serial copy management system," which allows
a first copy to be made onto DAT, but prevents all subsequent copies.
These examples suggest a number of conclusions at odds with popular
wisdom. Most obviously, they offer a cautionary note to the libertarian
techno-optimists who believe that technology always grows free from
governmental control and always moves in the direction of greater
liberty. Let us lay aside many of the assumptions behind that belief for
a moment, such as that governments are generally the greatest threat to
daily liberty, or, conversely, that liberty should be defined primarily
around the absence of governmental restraint. Even with these
qualifications, the idea that the technological changes of the digital
revolution are always outside the control of the state seems unproven.
In fact, the state is working very hard to design its commands into the
very technologies that, collectively, are supposed to spell its demise.
Another point needs to be made; there are-whether one likes them
or not--strong arguments that the "technologies of freedom" actually
require an intensification of the mechanisms of surveillance, public and
private, to which we are currently subjected. If the digital technologies
enlarge our space for living, both conceptually and practically, the
dangers posed by that expansion will prompt the demand-often the
very reasonable demand-that the Panopticon be hardwired into the
"technologies of freedom."7b
VII. CONCLUSION
Looked at in a vaguely Foucauldian light, these examples I have given
in this Article seem to point to two conclusions, conclusions which may
seem paradoxical. On the one hand, the studies indicate that the
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C) (1994). See Susan Friewald, Uncetain Privacy Communication Attributes
Afler the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949 (1996).
75. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010(1994).
76. See generally ITHILL DE SOiA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983).
CORPORA TE LA W SYMPOSIUM 0
confident assumption that the state cannot regulate cyberspace is
definitionally blind to some of the most important ways that some states
could, in fact, exert power. The jurisprudence of digital libertarianism
could use a lot less John Austin and a lot more Michel Foucault. But
one cannot simply limit the analysis to the available avenues of state
power. Foucault's Discipline and Punish was not a manual for state
officials, but a challenge--in some ways similar to the challenges posed
by legal realism and feminism--to the very categories of public and
private and to the belief that power begins and ends with the state.
We need a similar challenge to those categories in cyberspace. If the
first conclusion of this study is that the state may actually have more
power than the digerati believe, the second conclusion is that the
attraction of technical solutions is that they apparently elide the question
of power-both private and public-in the first place. The technology
appears to be "just the way things are"; its origins are concealed,
whether those origins lie in state-sponsored scheme or market-structured
order, and its effects are obscured because it is hard to imagine the
alternative. Above all, technical solutions are less contentious; we think
of a legal regime as coercing, and a technological regime as merely
shaping-or even actively facilitating-our choices. In the Lochner era,
a strikingly similar contrast was drawn between the coercive nature of
public law and the free private world of a market that was merely
shaped by neutral, facilitative rules of contract and property. The legal
realists did a remarkably good job of pointing out the shortcomings of
that picture of the market. If we are to have some alternatives to the
jurisprudence of digital libertarianism, we will have to offer a richer
picture of Internet politics than that of the coercive (but impotent) state
and the neutral and facilitative technology.
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